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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
XORTHCREST, I~C., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
- vs.-
\V ALI(ER BAN"K & TRUST COM-
PAXY, a corporation, as executor 
of the last will and testament and 
estate of LUCIER. THOMAS, who 
was sometimes known as L. R. 
THOMAS, deceased; JOHN LIV-
INGSTON THO~iAS and ADE-
LAIDE R. THO~iAS, his wife; 
and GERTRUDE THOMAS 
GARDNER, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
HrGH L. THOMAS, JR., unmar-
ried; WALTER WRIGHT; and 




Reply Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT ON REPLY 
In reply to the Brief of respondents, N orthcrest 
files this Reply Brief. The points to be argued in reply 
follow. 
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2 NORTHCREST, INC., VS. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS IN REPLY 
Northcrest's Title Through Utah Savings And Trust 
Company. 
1. Respondents Failed To Establish By Clear, Con-
vincing, Unequivocal And Conclusive Evidence That 
The Deed From LucieR. Thomas (And Husband) To 
Utah Savings And Trust Company Was Intended A~ 
A Mortgage. 
2. The Evidence By Utah Savings And Trust Company 
Attempting To Prove The Deed As A Mortgage Was 
Incompetent After It Had Conveyed To N orthcrest. 
Northcrest's Title Through Hugh L. Thomas, Jr. 
1. The Notary's Testimony Denying Lucie Acknowl-
edged The Deed To Hugh, Jr. Was Incompetent. 
2. The Certificate Of Acknowledgment, By The Law of 
Evidence, Equalized the Notary's Testimony Repudi-
ating It. Hugh, Jr.'s Attempt To Corroborate The 
Notary Was Incompetent. The Evidence Was Thus. 
Left Equipoised And Respondents Failed To Sustain 
The Burden To Prove The Certificate Was False. 
3. Respondents' Claim Of Forgery Not Established. 
N orthcrest's Title Through H. H. Hempstead. 
1. Unfounded Charges ~Regarding Northcrest's Quiet 
Title Suit Against Hempsteads. 
2. The Deed From _Lucie .. To H. _H. Hempstead Was 
Delivered. 
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WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, ET AL. 3 
3. \YhateYer r:l'ax Title Lneie Obtained From Spencer 
Clawson Inured rro I-Iempstead, Her Grantee, Under 
Her Prior Warranty Deed To Him. 
4. Respondents Failed To Prove A Valid Tax Title In 
Spencer Clawson. 
Northcrest Was Not Estopped To Acquire The Utah 
Savings And The Hempstead Titles. 
Respondents Failed To Establish Adverse Title In 
Lucie R. Thomas And The Evidence Is Wholly Insufficient 
To Support The Finding. 
Correction As To The Yellow Lots. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 NORTHCREST, INC., VS. 
ARGUMENT ON REPLY 
NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH UTAH SAVINGS 
AND TRUST COMPANY 
1. Respondents Failed To Establish By Clear, Convincing, 
Unequivocal And Conclusive Evidence That The Deed 
From LucieR. Thomas (And Husband) To Utah Savings 
And Trust Company Was Intended As A Mortgage. 
Respondents failed entirely here. 
They admit the onus, starting this part of their 
Brief with a heading asserting that they did establish 
the deed as a mortgage by "clear, convincing and un-
equivocal" evidence. (Their Brief, Page 16). The de-
cisions by this court required such proof. Coray vs. 
Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2d 940. Thornley L. L. Com-
pany vs. Gailey, 105 Utah 519, 143 P. 2d 283. Gibbons 
vs. Gibbons, 103 Utah 266, 135 P. 2d 105. Pender vs. 
Anderson, (Utah), 235 P. 2d 360. 
They admit also "the mutual intention of the parties 
must be proved". Crheir Brief, Page 17). Of course, 
they must. This is clearly the law. 
But the mutual intention was not shown. At most, 
evidence only of the bank's intention was given. McGee, 
the bank's officer, was the only witness. His evidence, 
we submit, was not even proof of the bank's (grantee's) 
intention. But, assume for argument that it was, still 
there was a total lack of evidence about the intention of 
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WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, ET AL. 5 
Lucie and her husband, the grantors. Their intention, 
by this record, is a total blank. 
Please turn to Brief of Appellant, Pages 6 to 18. 
The entire lack of the intention of Lucie and her hus-
band is fully shown there. 
But, respondents contend Lucie went on to treat 
the property as still hers by paying taxes, etc. The 
character of the conYeyance, ho·wever, is determined by 
the agreement at the time; not subsequently. 
'' ... The character of the transaction is fixed at 
its inception; if an instrument is a mortgage at 
its inception, it remains so with all the incidents 
thereof, if it is not a mortgage at the time of its 
inception, it cannot be converted into such by a 
subsequent act of the parties." 36 Am. Jur. Mort-
gages §125. 
" ... the question whether a deed absolute in 
form is to be taken as a mortgage depends on 
the intention of the parties with respect to it at 
the time of its execution ... '' 59 C.J.S. Mort-
gages §36. 
Lucie's subsequent conduct claimed is purely self-
serving and amounts to no more than an implied declara-
tion that she later claimed an interest in the property; 
whereas, an express declaration of claim would have 
availed respondents nothing. This court has said just 
that. Look: 
"Should we assume without proof that Ruthrauff 
himself paid a share of the annual tax on the 
claim prior to his death, it would not affect or 
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6 NORTHCREST, INC., VS. 
impair his prior deed in 1902 as a conveyance. 
It would be at most an implied declaration that 
he still had or claimed an interest in the property. 
But an implied declaration to this effect by Ruth-
rauff is of no more value than his express dec-
laration would be in his own favor or that of his 
heirs. An express declaration of a claim by a 
grantor in a deed, self-serving and in disparage-
ment of his own solemn deed, is a nullity." Ruth-
rauff vs. Silver King Western Min. & Mill Co., 
95 Utah 279, 80 P. 2d 338, 343. 
The result is : 
''It is not evidence in his own favor or of those 
claiming under him. The principle of this rule 
is well stated in 22 C.J.S., at pages 234-236, title 
'Evidence', Sees. 213, 215, 217-219; Smith v. 
Hanson, 34 Utah 171, 96 P. 1087, 18 L.R.A., N.S., 
520; Diaz v. Industrial Comm., 80 Utah 77, 13 P. 
2d 307; Baird v. Baird, 193 Cal. 225, 223 P. 974". 
I d. 
Respondents finally say N orthcrest ''has suggested 
no other conclusion" than that the deed was intended 
to be a mortgage. (Their Brief, Page 19). But, it isn't 
up to N orthcrest to do any suggesting. It has no burden. 
Respondents are the ones who are trying to prove the 
mortgage. They have the burden, not N orthcrest. (Brief 
of Appellant, Pages 23, 47). They admit it. (Their Brief. 
Page 16). 
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WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, ET AL. 7 
NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH UTAH SAVINGS 
AND TRUST COMPANY (Cont'd.) 
2. The Evidence By Utah Savings And Trust Company 
Attempting To Prove The Deed As A Mortgage Was 
Incompetent After It Had Conveyed To N orthcrest. 
Respondents admit again. 
They admit the rule: 
" ... the general rule that a grantor may not, 
after parting with his title, make statements or 
admissions in disparagement of his title ... '' Re-
spondents' Brief, Page 20. 
For a discussion of the rule, turn to Brief of Ap-
pellant, Page 25. 
But, respondents deny the rule applies here. They 
say the bank's evidence by its officer, McGee, (3 years 
after it had conveyed to Northcrest) was not what con-
stituted the "statement" or "declaration" in this case. 
By their admission, if it did, then it was clearly incom-
petent, being made> after the conveyance. 
They say what constituted the "declaration" was 
the bank's memo of a security transaction entered on 
the loan cards (Exhibit 8) years ago (1914) when the 
bank had title; .ergo, they argue, the "declaration" was 
made before and not after the bank conveyed to North-
crest. This is so ingenious that no one else has ever 
thought of it before; not even respondents' erudite 
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8 NORTHCREST, INC., VS. 
counsel at the trial. And, we have now searched in vain 
for a similar assertion in the texts and cases. But it is 
a stranger there so far as we can find. The reason must 
be apparent. To make a declaration is to declare and 
"declare" means, it is said: 
''To make known ; tell openly or publicly; pro-
claim formally; publish; make a solemn affir-
mation before witnesses" etc. Webster's Modern 
Reference Dictionary. 
And a "dcelaration", it Is said, means: 
"The act of declaring or proclaiming; that which 
is declared; an assertion; publication". Id. 
2 Words and Phrases, Page 1904, says: 
''The word 'declare' signifies to make known, 
to assert to others ; to show forth ... '' etc. 
A "declaration" requires (1) a declarant, and, 
( 2) a making known, a ''proclaiming''. In other words, 
a communicating. But "to make known" or "commu-
nicate", something else is also required: (3) a hea-rer; 
someone to whom the declaration is "made known" or 
''proclaimed'' or communicated. 
This must be so, for in the cases '''here disparaging 
statements or declarations of former owners are re-
corded, they \Yere usually related by a "hearer" of the 
statement; one to whom the grantor "made known", 
''told openly'', ''proclaimed'', ''asserted'' or commumi-
cated the defect in his title while he owned it. 
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WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, ET AL. 9 
But test the situation here. Utah Savings made only 
a prin1te, silent, secret entry on the loan cards (Exhibit 
8) years before. This \Yas only the silent entry of a 
secret thought. That secret wa:::; not then "made known", 
''told openly", "proclaimed'' or "affirmed before wit-
nesses'' or ''asserted to others'' at all. It was not com-
municated. It lay hidden among the bank's records, 
silent and unproclairned, 37 years (1914 to 1951) until 
over 3 years after the bank conveyed to N orthcrest 1n 
1947. Utah SaYings made no declaration up to 1951. 
But, in1951 Utah Savings did make a "declaration". 
rrhat was when the declaration here was first made. It 
was at the trial. Utah Savings then "declared" by its 
officer, McGee, that it had formerly (37 years ago) held 
a warranty deed-not this specified deed, just some deed 
-as security. But this was after it had parted with title 
and conveyed to N orthcrest. That declaration, therefore, 
was incompetent under the rule. And the rule is con-
fessed by respondents. The trial court erred in admit-
ting this incompetent declaration by Utah Savings after 
it had conveyed to N orthcrest. 
Shop Book Rule. Respondents cite the Shop Book 
Rule as supporting the security entry on the loan cards 
(Exhibit 8). (Their Brief 23). Shop books are admis-
sible as evidence, prima facie. 20 Am. J ur. Evidence 
~1043. But not if they are incompetent for some other 
reason; for being, as here, part of the forbidden declara-
tions of a prior O\vner. 
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10 NORTHCREST, INC., VS • 
.Ancient Document Rule. The 30-year Ancient Docu-
ment Rule cannot save respondents, either. This rule 
does not go to the competency of documents but more 
properly to their manner of proof; dispensing with 
their first being authenticated by testimony. But, they 
must be relevant ( 20 Am. J ur. Evidence §932) and, of 
course, otherwise competent to be admissible. 
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WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, ET AL. 11 
NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH 
HUGH L. THOMAS, JR. 
1. The Notary's Testimony Denying Lucie Acknowledged 
The Deed To Hugh, Jr. Was Incompetent. 
Respondents argue the pros and cons of this propo-
sition of law. (Their Brief, Page 24). 
We adm.it the courts are divided. We frankly told 
the court so in our Brief of Appellant, Page 31. It is a 
difficult problem. Opposed in every case are the rights 
of a grantor on the one hand; those of innocent persons 
dealing on the faith of the recorded acknowledgment, 
on the other. 
The question is not may an acknowledgment be 
proved false. It is narrower, only: May it be proved 
false by the notary who has already solemnly certified 
that it is genuine1 The answer1 There are authorities 
on each side. The court will have to choose. 
Respondents ascribe ''great courage'' to this de-
ceitful notary. (Their Brief, Page 43). Seeking to pro-
vide her with credibility of sorts they ennoble her with 
traits of great courage and forthrightness in forswearing 
her constitutional oath as notary and renouncing her 
certificate on the deed. This sanctifies her testimony, 
they argue, for thus she invited a damage suit by North-
crest. But, if this notary was noble, then so were all 
the notaries in the books who testified that their certifi-
cates were lies. Of what avail is a damage suit against 
a notary like this on a $500.00 bond~ 
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH 
HUGH L. THOMAS, JR. (Cont'd.) 
2. The Certificate Of Acknowledgment, By The Law Of 
Evidence, Equalized The Notary's Testimony Repudi-
ating It. Hugh, Jr.'s Attempt To Corroborate The 
Notary Was Incompetent. The Evidence Was Thus Left 
Equipoised And Respondents Failed To Sustain The 
Burden To Prove The Certificate Was False. 
''. . . The decisions disclose a very decided tend-
ency on the part of the courts to attach weight 
to certificates of acknowledgment and to view 
attempts to discredit them with suspicion and 
distrust. 
. . . a high degree of proof is required. It fre-
quently has been stated ... the evidence must 
be clear, cogent, and convincing beyond reason-
able controversy . 
. . . It has been said that such evidence must be 
almost as strong as that required to correct a 
mistake in a deed. Thus, it appears that the bur-
den assumed by the assailant of the certificate is, 
if the language of the rule is to be understood in 
its literal sense, much greater than that usually 
cast upon a party by a presumption of fact. Gen-
erally, a mere 11rcponderance of evidence is not 
sufficient to overcome the certificate . ... '' 1 Am. 
Jur. Acknowledgments §155. 
What of the evidence here? rrhe rases say the cer-
tificate is entitled to as much weight as the notary's 
subsequent denial; that it is equivalent to the sworn 
testimony of one disinterested witness, and the denial 
should be given hut little weight. 1 C.J.S. Arknowledg-
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ments §§ 1-!1, 1-!~. ::)parker rs. Sparker, 274 N.Y.S. 454, 
152 ~lise. 867. (See Brief of Appellant, ~~[>). 
''The certificate is made evidenee under the 
statute. It should, therefore, be entitled to as 
much, if not more, weight than the evidence of 
the officer who executed it, when offered to im-
peach its validity." Sparker vs. Sparker, supra. 
"(The certificate) is equivalent to the sworn tes-
timony of one apparently disinterested witness.'' 
1 C.J.S. Acknowledgments §141. 
By the foregoing, the certificate itself was (1) 
equivalent to the testimony of one disinterested witness 
supporting it, and, (2) entitled to as much weight as the 
notary's testimony, if not more. 
So the eYidence that far was at equipoise; the certi-
ficate equalized the notary's renunciation. Hence, re-
spondents could not stop there. Remember, theirs was 
the burden of proving a false certificate; not by a mere 
preponderance either, but, as the first quotation above 
states, by evidence which was "clear, cogent and con-
vincing beyond reasonable controversy". 1 Am. Jur. 
Acknowledgments §155, supra. 
So, they called Hugh, Jr. for corroboration. Re-
spondents say Hugh (their younger brother who got 
$3200.00 from Northcrest on the strength of the deed) 
corroborated the notary's denial of the acknowledgment. 
Brother Hugh, respondents argue, clinched things for 
them when he testified his mother was not in Salt Lake 
to acknowledge the deed. (Their Brief 44). But Hugh's 
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testimony was given over Northcrest's positive objec-
tion. (Tr. 81) It was wholly incompetent. It was an at-
tempt (like McGee's testimony for Utah Savings) to make 
a declaration against a former title after the grantor 
(Hugh, Jr.) had conveyed to Northcrest; it also violated 
his covenants of warranty in his deed to Northcrest 
(Exhibit C) as well. Hugh's deed to Northcrest (Ex-
hibit C) was a warranty deed with full covenants of 
warranty. Therefore, the statute says, he warranted 
"that he was fully seised of the premises; that he had 
a good right to convey the same ... that he will forever 
warrant and defend the title thereof in the grantee ... " 
etc. §78-1-11 U.C.A. But, far from "defending the title" 
in his grantee, Hugh sought to assail it by saying at the 
trial his mother could not have acknowledged the prior 
deed to him (Exhibit B) because she was away. But, 
grantors may not assail the titles of their grantees. 
They are estopped. 
''A grantor is generally estopped from denying 
the title of his grantee or his own authority to 
sell". 19 Am. J ur. Estoppel §10. 
''A grantor is estopped to assert anything in 
derogation of his deed." 31 C.J.S. Estoppel §13. 
"It is a well settled principal of the common law 
that no man shall be allowed to dispute his own 
solemn deed.'' 5 Thompson on Real Property 
§2602. 
By his statutory warranty ( §78-1-11) Hugh, Jr. war-
ranted he was the lawful owner. This estopped him from 
asserting otherwise. He was barred from testifying as 
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he did against the validity of his mother's deed to him 
(Exhibit B). 
Northcrest objected and moved to strike Hugh's 
testimony about Lucie not being in Salt Lake to ack-
nowledge the deed, as incompetent; also as an attempt 
to dispute and violate his own deed to Northcrest. (Tr. 
81-82). It was overruled. (Tr. 82). This was error. In 
fact, Hugh, on being led closer to the firing line, finally 
refused to talk any more because of self incrimination 
and was excused. ( Tr. 83). 
A situation exactly similar was presented in Han.-
sen vs. Daniels, 73 Utah 142, 272 P. 941, where a mort-
gage contained covenants of warranty and the mortgagor 
was afterward called to testify that another owned an 
interest in the mortgaged property (sheep). This court 
held the testimony incompetent as violating the war-
ranty and written instrument. 
On this evidence (1) that of the untrustworthy 
notary, and, (2) the incompetent testimony of respon-
dents' brother, Hugh, the trial court struck down the 
certificate of acknowledgment. This was error. 
We say this does not present a question of credi-
bility or weight at all. It is only a question of applying 
the rule of evidence. The certificate itself equalized the 
denial of the notary. It was equal to the testimony of 
one disinterested witness. And, Hugh's testimony in 
corroboration was incompetent because (1) it violated 
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his covenant of warranty in his deed to N orthcrest, and, 
(2) it was an attempted disparagement of his former 
title after he conveyed to N orthcrest. 
Respondents are left thus: Hugh's incompetent 
corroboration must be ruled out. The notary's denial 
failed to outweigh her certificate. Respondents have not 
sustained the burden of proof to nullify the acknowledg-
ment. 
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH 
HUGH L. THOMAS, JR. (Cont'd.) 
3. Respondents' Claim Of Forgery Not Established. 
Respondents argue needlessly that the signature on 
the deed (Exhibit B) from Lucie to son, Hugh, Jr. was 
not signed by her. ('J.1heir Brief 40). They need not 
argue that. N orthcrest admits it. But the argument 
say8 the deed was proved a forgery. Not so. All re-
spondents proved (and all Northcrest admits) is that 
the deed was not in Lucie's hand. There is quite a dif-
ference. 
A forged deed, to be sure, passes no title. It is 
spurious and null. But simple proof (or admission) that 
a signature is not in the hand of a named signer does 
not establish forgery. The proof must show that the 
signature was not authorized. State vs. Jones, 81 Utah 
503, 20 P. 2d 614. See Brief of Appellant, 39-40. 
Respondents' argument of forgery assumes too 
much. It assumes exactly what is up for inquiry here-
the validity or invalidity of Lucie's signature to the 
deed. 
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH 
H. H. HEMPSTEAD 
1. Unfounded Charges Regarding Northcrest's Quiet Title 
Suit Against Hempsteads. 
'' ... if none of the relatives ... will accept, ... 
a person having a claim in or adverse to the 
estate shall be entitled to letters (of administra-
tion) ... " §102-4-3 U.C.A. 
''Administration may be granted to one or more 
competent persons ... at the request of the 
person entitled filed in court.'' §102-4-1 U.C.A. 
H. H. Hempstead's estate was first probated in 
California. His wife, Lucy S. Hempstead, survived. She 
was sole devisee under his will and his only heir. This 
was stated and proved by respondents' counsel himself. 
(Tr. 87). Hempstead lived in San Francisco. (Respon-
dents' Brief 47). 
After Hempstead died, N orthcrest secured a deed 
from his wife (sole devisee and heir) to the West 40 
acre tract (less the 20 x 30 rods. See Sketch, Brief of 
Appellant, 42). ~orthcrest thereby got the full Hemp-
stead title which had devolved on Hempstead's widow 
on his death. N orthcrest thus became "a person having 
a claim in or adverse to the estate'' of Hempstead. As 
such, and as authorized by the quoted statute, it was 
then entitled to letters of administration in its own name 
or to nominate another ''competent person or persons''. 
It did. It petitioned the District Court, Salt Lake 
County, and nominated A. P. Lakin and secured his ap-
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pointment as administrator with Hempstead's will an-
nexed in Utah. This the statutes specifically authorized 
and provided for. Northcrest then also sued and got a 
decree quieting title against ( 1) Mrs. Hempstead, the 
sole heir and devisee, and (2) Hempstead's adminis-
trator. 
But respondents criticize this procedure. They 
charge that this might amount to fraud upon the court 
and Hempstead's creditors. (Their Brief 47). Hemp-
stead's widow (sole heir and devisee) got the property 
from Hempstead by his death. It was hers. She was 
then the sole owner. And upon this record there were 
no creditors of Hempstead. His creditors, if any, must 
have been provided for by the California probate of his 
estate where he lived. And the court in the Utah quiet 
title proceedings must have been advised in the premises 
and well able to look out for its judicial self. Upon this 
record there were no creditors. There are none. But, 
if there were, it will be time enough to hear from them, 
if and when they complain. Respondents and their 
counsel cannot appoint themselves to look after Hemp-
stead's creditors. Respondents and their counsel have 
no part of the Hempstead estate. They are neither 
creditors, heirs or devisees. Hempstead's widow was 
the sole heir and devisee. Not respondents. Not their 
counsel. What concern of respondents or their counsel 
is it as to what happened to Hempstead's estate~ It 
passed to his widow. And, are respondents or their 
<·ounsel the court's keeper in the quiet title action? 
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Respondents and their eager counsel are not appointed 
to protect Hempstead's creditors nor the court. Just 
whom then are they looking after? Those proceedings 
do not concern them. They are total strangers thereto. 
Let the creditors (if any) and the court in the quiet 
title action (if it deems itself imposed upon) come for-
ward, if they will. It will be time enough to hear them 
if and when they do. N orthcrest and we, its counsel, 
will respond willingly and confidently. The statute sets 
the authority for what was done. Smoke screens labeled 
fraud ill become their makers. They oftentimes smoke 
out those who set them-even lawyers. Respondents' 
charges are a complete departure from their counsel's 
statement at the trial: ''Now I don't mean to imply 
there was any impropriety in so doing". (Tr. 92). 
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH 
H. H. HEMPSTEAD (Cont'd.) 
2. The Deed From Lucie To H. H. Hempstead Was 
Delivered. 
Respondents say the deed from Lucie to Hempstead 
(Exhibit F) was recorded by Lucie herself and, there-
fore, they argue, no delivery was established and Hemp-
stead got no title thereby. 
But, recording creates a presumption (rebuttable 
though it may be) of delivery. 
''As a general rule the filing and recording of a 
deed is prima facie evidence of delivery, but this 
presumption is rebuttable. The record of a deed 
by the grantor is presumptive evidence of a most 
cogent character tending to show delivery, for it 
is tantamount to a public proclamation by the 
grantor at a public place, intended for the world 
to act upon, that the grantor had in apt and due 
form transferred his title (and thereby his land) 
to another.'' 7 Thompson on Real Property §4185. 
"The recording of a deed ordinarily creates a 
rebuttable presumption of its delivery to, and its 
acceptance by, the grantee." 26 C.J.S. Deeds 
§187. 
The recording of the deed to Hempstead established, 
prima facie, its delivery. Respondents had the right to 
offer evidence to overcome that presumption. They of-
fered none. They proved nothing. The presumption that 
the deed \vas delivered stands unrefuted. 
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Respondents cite Chamberlain vs. Larsen, 83 Utah 
420, 29 P. 2d 355. But they are wrong. That case says: 
''. . . the recording of a deed is likewise evidence of 
delivery". 29 P. 2d 361. 
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH 
H. H. HEMPSTEAD (Cont'd.) 
3. Whatever Tax Title Lucie Obtained From Spencer 
Clawson Inured To Hempstead, Her Grantee, Under Her 
Prior Warranty Deed To Him. 
Respondents contend the Hempstead title was ex-
tinguished by tax sale. (Their Brief 48). This is based 
entirely on the abstract of title in evidence. (Exhibit 11). 
But, the abstract (Page 35 thereof) shows that when 
Lucie R. Thomas deeded to Hempstead (1908) by war-
ranty deed, the taxes were already delinquent for the 
prior year (1907). (Abstract, Page 32). Lucie's deed 
to Hempstead is shown in full as Exhibit F. It was a 
warranty deed. And it contained no exceptions. It was 
a full warranty. Consequently, she thereby warranted 
as against the already delinquent tax of 1907. And that 
warranty estopped her from asserting anything, in-
cluding this delinquent tax, against Hempstead and his 
grantees. (See Page 14, supra). 
Furthermore, Spencer Clawson, to whom the audi-
tor's tax deed (1912) ran, (Abstract, Page 43) after-
ward quit-claimed his interest to Lucie R. Thomas in 
1915. (Abstract, Page 49). That after-acquired title 
(so-called) which Lucie got from Clawson then imme-
diately inured to the benefit of Hempstead, to whom she 
had previously conveyed by warranty deed. The statute 
f-iaid so. 
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"After acquired title inures to prior grantee. If any 
person shall hereafter convey any real estate by 
conveyance purporting to convey the same in fee 
simple absolute, and shall not at the time of such 
conveyance have the legal estate in such real 
estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same, the 
legal estate subsequently acquired shall immedi-
ately pass to the grantee, his heirs, successors, 
or assigns, and such conveyance shall be as valid 
as if such legal estate had been in the grantor at 
the time of the conveyance.'' §1979 Compiled 
Laws of Utah 1907. §4879 Compiled Laws of 
Utah 1919. §78-1-9 Revised.Statutes of Utah 1933. 
§78-1-9 U.C.A. 1943. 
But respondents admit the rule. For they say it 
applies to a 1/3 interest - which they say Hugh, Jr. in-
herited from his mother, Lucie, after his deed to North-
crest (Exhibit C). Look: 
"After the date of that deed Lucie R. Thomas 
died and Hugh L. Thomas, Jr. as one of her 
heirs and devisees, succeeded to an undivided 
one-third interest in the lands in suit, subject 
however to the probate of his mother's estate. 
Under the doctrine of after acquired title, appel-
lant (N orthcrest) acquired an undivided one-
third interest in lands by virtue of its deed from 
Hugh L. Thomas, Jr .... " etc. (Parentheses and 
emphasis ours). (Their Brief, 53.) 
In fact, the award in respondent's findings to North-
crest of an undivided third is predicated on respondents' 
proposition that after Hugh conveyed to Northcrest, he 
inherited 1/3 from his mother, Lucie, and that after-
acquired inheritance passed to Northcrest by his prior 
deed. 
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH 
H. H. HEMPSTEAD (Cont'd'.) 
4. Respondents Failed To Prove A Valid Tax Title In 
Spencer Clawson. 
We have just seen that whatever tax title Lucie got 
from Clawson inured to her grantee, H. H. Hem~stead, 
under her earlier warranty deed to him. But, we shall 
now see that no Yalid tax title was proved by respondents. 
"It has long been held in this jurisdiction that 
one who relies on a tax title must show that all 
of the requirements of the law were complied 
with in the issuance of that tax title. Asper v. 
:\loon, 24 Utah 241, 67 P. 409; Bean v. Fairbanks, 
46 Utah 513, 151 P. 338; Bolognese v. Anderson, 
87 Utah 450, 44 P. 2d 706." Anson vs. Ellison, 
104 Utah 576, 140 P. 2d 653. 
This is the same as the common law rule which: 
" ... was strict in its requirement that the holder 
of the tax title should by his evidence exhibit the 
proceedings, from step to step." (Italics added). 
51 Am. Jur. Taxation §1091. 
The alleged tax sale and deed were in 1908 and 1912 
respectively. (Abstract, Pages 32, 43). So they were 
governed by Compiled Laws of Utah 1907. To aid a 
tax title holder in his proof ''from step to step'', the 
law at that time helped-part way-but only in regard 
to the auditor's tax deed. It said, the tax deed, -" ... 
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts recited there-
in". §2629 Compiled Laws of Utah 1907, Cf. §6030 Com-
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piled Laws of Utah 1917. §80-10-66 Revised Statutes of 
Utah 1933. §80-10-68 (7) U.C.A. 1943. 
But no such efficacy was applied to the certificate 
of sale. Its form was specifically prescribed and set out 
in full detail by the statute. §2624 Compiled Laws of 
Utah 1907. The 1917 Compilation varied the form, but 
still the Legislature provided no evidentiary value to 
the certificate. §6021 Compiled Laws of Utah 1917. It 
was 1921 before the certificate of sale was made prima 
facie evidence, the Legislature saying: 
"(The certificate of sale) herein provided for 
... shall be prima facie evidence of the regularity 
of all proceedings connected with the assessment 
notice, equalization, levies, advertisement and 
sale of the property . " §6021 Laws of Utah 
1921. 
But, the 1921 law did not make 1908 certificates evi-
dence. Statutes operate prospectively, not retroactively. 
Furthermore, the 1921 statutory certificate (set forth in 
the law) varied in form from the 1907 one. And the 1921 
law was addressed to 1921 (and subsequent) certificates, 
for it said: "the certificate of sale herein provided for" 
should be evidence; not a 1907 certificate. 
But, assume for argument that the tax certificate 
here (1907) had been made evidence by the 1921 (or 
even the 1943) law. In that case, the certificate and the 
auditor's tax deed both would be prima facie evidence 
of the acts and things recited only when put in evidence. 
But respondents did not put them in evidence. All that 
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was introduced 'vas the abstract of title. It does not 
even purport to exhibit the contents of either the certi-
ficate or tax deed. All the abstract contains is a brief 
me·mo of each. (Abstract, Pages 32, 43). The form of 
the certificate is not set forth to be tested for its com-
pliance with the law. Nor is the form of the tax deed 
set out so as to show ''the facts recited therein'' to be 
tested for their compliance. Respondents had access to 
these recorded documents but rested upon their mere 
notation in the abstract. But, that notation is not enough. 
It is no more than proof that a certificate and a tax deed 
were issued without disclosing their contents. It is 
exactly the same as if it had been merely stipulated that 
these documents were issued. This court has already 
passed upon that situation and found it wanting. The 
decision is well reflected in the following headnote : 
"Stipulation that certificate of sale had been is-
sued on realty sold for delinquent taxes and 
county's quitclaim deed of such realty to plain-
tiff which deed recited that it was issued pursuant 
to statute relating to sale of land for delinquent 
taxes did not make a 'prima facie case' of title 
in plaintiff." Anson vs. Ellison, 104 Utah 576, 
140 P. 2d 653. 
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NORTH CREST WAS NOT ESTOPPED TO ACQUIRE 
THE UTAH SAVINGS AND THE HEMPSTEAD TITLES 
Respondents misconceive the rule. They argue that 
Northcrest, having taken one title, (through Hugh, Jr.) 
was estopped to later acquire and assert these other 
titles (from Hempstead and Utah Savings) against 
Lucie's estate and devisees. (Their Brief, 48). 
As to Hugh, Jr., exactly the reverse would be the 
rule. Having conveyed and warranted to N orthcrest, 
Hugh would be the one estopped. He could not after-
ward acquire and assert an adverse title against North-
crest. The estoppel bars him, not N orthcrest. But he 
defaulted. He claims no estoppel in his favor. Respon-
dents cannot claim it for him. 
As to respondents, if they mean to argue that North-
crest became estopped as to Lucie or her estate or de-
visees (John and Gertrude) the argument is a curious 
one. They furiously contend that Lucie's deed to Hugh 
(Exhibit B) was null; in other words, that this title 
Northcrest claims under and which created the estoppel 
was no title at all! If that is so, no estoppel resulted; 
none will by a void deed. 
Respondents confuse the rule. Their citations dis-
close the misconception. Those offered (Their Brief, 49, 
50) all deal with situations where a vendee is purchasing 
but has not paid out, and meanwhile acquires an adverse 
title and asserts it against his vendor. But, in that 
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executory relation, the law refuses to permit him to do 
so. He is estopped. It is as if Northcrest had been pur-
chasing on contract from Hugh but bought up the Utah 
Savings and Hempstead titles before paying him in full 
and sought to assert them against Hugh to avoid paying 
him out. X orthcrest, in that situation, would surely be 
estopped and could not avoid payment. But the estoppel 
would only run in Hugh's favor, not Lucie's or her 
devisees. They were not parties to Hugh's and North-
crest 's supposed contract. 
The estoppel described extends to many relations: 
~Iortgagor and Mortgagee, 
36 Am. Jur. Mortgages §241. 
Columbia Trust Co. vs. Nielsen, 76 Utah 129, 
287 P. 926. 
Landlord and Tenant, 
32 Am. Jur. Landlord and Tenant, §113, §118. 
Vend or and Vendee, 
35 Am. Jur. Vendor and Purchaser, §381. 
Tenants in Common, 
Columbia Tnrst Co. vs. Nielsen, supra. 
But, in very case where the estoppel arises, it IS 
out of an obligation, legal or moral, to another which 
renders it unfair to acquire antagonistic rights against 
such other. 35 Am. Jur. Vendor and Purchaser §381. 
Northcrest owed no obligation to Lucie, John or Ger-
trude. It had no dealings with them at all. And, after 
i it pai<l Hugh in full, it owed him none. So, it was free 
to acquire, as it did, the Utah Savings and Hempstead 
~ ~ titles. It was not estopped. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 NORTHCREST, INC., VS. 
N orthcrest quieted title against Hempstead's widow. 
(Exhibit 10, Files in action by Northcrest vs. Hemp-
stead.) Respondents say N orthcrest is estopped to claim 
the Hempstead title because it alleged therein and got a 
judgment holding it was of no force. The estoppel 
claimed is an estoppel "by record". 31 C.J.S. Estoppel 
§5. But allegations in a pleading of a prior action "do 
not as a rule operate in a subsequent case, proceeding 
or transaction as a technical estoppel by record against 
the party making them". 31 C.J.S. Estoppel §7. But, 
respondents were not parties to the N orthcrest-Hemp-
stead quiet title action. Nor do they claim through it or 
thereunder. Consequently, they cannot claim the alleged 
estoppel because,-
'' Estoppels by record exist only as between the 
same parties or those in legal privity with them, 
and cannot be insisted on by one who is not him-
self bound thereby." 31 C.J.S. Estoppel §8. 
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RESPONDENTS FAILEU TO ESTABLISH ADVERSE 
TITLE IN LUCIE R. THOMAS AND THE EVIDENCE IS 
WHOLLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE F'INDING. 
Hespondents say that they proved Lucie established 
title by adverse possession and that it extinguished the 
outstanding titles of Utah Savings and Hempstead. The 
court made a finding of adverse possession. (Their Brief, 
51, 52). 
There was no testimony by any witness on this point. 
Absolutely none. The only evidence relating to this at 
all is a stipulation that Lucie paid taxes. It was stipu-
lated that she paid the taxes of 1918 to 1935, and from 
1938 through 1945. (The lands were sold for taxes in 
1935 and 1936). (Tr. 100). 
But Lucie's deed to Hempstead (Exhibit F) was in 
1908. It was outstanding against her ever after. North-
crest secured that title from Hempstead's widow (1950) 
and quieted title against Hempstead's estate (1951). 
This title covered the West 40 acre tract (less 20 x 30 
rods). And Lucie's deed to Utah Savings was 1914. 
(Exhibit D). It was also outstanding against her ever 
after and Northcrest acquired that title from Utah Sav-
ings in 1947 (Exhibit E). This covered all of the prop-
erty, both 40 acre tracts (less the 20 x 30 rods). 
So, during all of the years in question (1918-1945) 
and long before, these two deeds were outstanding. 
Those deeds established, of course, a "legal title" in 
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Hempstead and Utah Savings. (One or the other on the 
West 40 and Utah Savings on the East 40 acre tract). 
Hempstead and Utah Savings respectively were, there-
fore, deemed to have been in possession all the while, 
and it was up to respondents to prove otherwise. The 
statute says so. 
"104-2-7. Adverse Possession-Possession Presumed 
in Owner. In every action for the recovery of real 
property, or the possession thereof, the person 
establishing a legal title to the property shall be 
presumed to have been possessed thereof within 
the time required by law; and the occupation of 
the property by any other person shall be deemed 
to have been under and in subordination to the 
legal title, unless it appears that the property has 
been held and possessed adversely to such legal 
title for seven years before the commencement of 
the action.'' 
This court has said : 
''According to this the presumption is that the 
legal title is in the owner, unless it appears that 
the property was held and possessed adversely 
to him for seven years.'' Funk vs. Anderson, 22 
Utah 238, 61 P. 1006. 
Respondents didn't prove anything about Lucie's 
occupancy. The record is silent as to that; wholly bar-
ren. No one testified about possession at all. Respon-
dents offered no evidence on that point. There was none. 
They stood upon payment of the taxes alone. Obviously, 
that was valueless. And yet the trial court made the 
astonishing finding that Lucie was at all times in exclu-
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s1ve possession! (Finding 20, Tr. 110). There 1s no 
evidence that Lucie occupied these lands, absolutely none. 
But, if Lucie had actually occupied the lands (which 
she did not) still, by the statute and decisions, she would 
be deemed to have done so "under and in subordination" 
to the "legal title" established in Hempstead and Utah 
Savings by their respective deeds, which were outstand-
ing at all times claimed. The burden thus rested on 
respondents to prove she ''possessed and occupied'' the 
lands adversely. To prove that kind of possession and 
occupancy, they were bound by statute to establish (and 
they didn't even try) not only actual occupancy by Lucie 
but also that she had (1) cultivated or improved, or, (2) 
fenced the lands, or, (3) used them for supply of fuel, 
fencing timber or pasturage, etc. §104-2-9, §104-2-11 
U.C.A. This is the only way land can be possessed ad-
cersely. The statutory methods are exclusive. Jenkins 
vs. Morgan, 113 Utah 534, 196 P. 2d 871. H.O.L.C. vs. 
Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 P. 2d 160. Central P. Ry. Co. 
vs. Tarpey, 51 Utah 107, 168 P. 554. 
There was no evidence of Lucie's occupancy at all. 
On such a record there can be no adverse possession. It 
was so held in Jenkins vs. Morgan, supra, this court 
saying: 
"\Ve find no evidence in the record that the de-
fendants have complied with the requirements 
therein set forth . . . It would thus appear that 
defendants have failed to establish occupation or 
possession within the limits of the statutory re-
quirements." Jenkins rs. JVl organ, supra. 
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Since there was no evidence whatever that Lucie 
(1) occupied these lands, and, (2) that she also culti-
vated, improved, fenced or otherwise did with them as 
the statute requires, respondents failed to establish any 
adverse possession and the court's finding that she did 
is not sustained and must be set aside. 
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CORRECTION AS TO THE YELLOW LOTS 
Respondents haYe pointed out (Their Brief, 9) that 
in our first Brief of Appellant (Pages 46, 50) Northcrest 
conceded 2/3 of the 32 "yellow lots" was properly 
awarded them, leaving 1j3 properly awarded to North-
crest. 
\Ye confess a contingent correction, 1n part, must 
be made. 
The yellow lots are within the 20 x 30 rod strip in 
the \Vest 40 acre tract. (See ~lap, Exhibit A). This 
strip is platted and is Capitol Heights second filing. (Re-
spondents' Brief, 3). 
Lucie's deeds (1) to Utah Savings, and, (2) to Hemp-
stead (Exhibits E and F) both excluded this 20 x 30 
rod strip. Lucie's deed to Hugh, Jr. skirted out around 
the 20 x 30 rod strip also. (Exhibit B). But, it actually 
included the yellow lots therein in a separate paragraph 
by referring to them (Paragraph 2 therein) by specific 
reference to the lot number of each lot. Hugh's deed to 
N orthcrest, which followed, conveyed all of Capitol 
Heights second filing (which, of course, included the 
yellow lots. (Exhibit C). 
Therefore, if Lucie's deed to Hugh is sustained, 
then X orthcrest must be awarded the entire property 
and cannot be limited to a 1/3 interest in the yellow lots. 
In that case, those lots passed from Lucie-to-Hugh-to 
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Northcrest. We acknowledge our error in the Brief of 
Appellant in this respect accordingly. 
If, however, Lucie's deed to Hugh is not sustained, 
then N orthcrest 's title comes through Hempstead or 
Utah Savings. But Lucie's deeds to them did not include 
the tract containing the yellow lots. Therefore, in such 
case, N orthcrest must have only a lj3 interest in the 
yellow lots which went to Hugh by inheritance from his 
mother and passed and inured to N orthcrest by his prior 
deed to it. 
To this extent we willingly stand corrected. 
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CONCLUSION 
All contentions of respondents have been fully met 
and answered by this Reply Brief. Northcrest now 
submits: 
1. Respondents failed to prove by clear, convinc-
ing, unequiYocal and conclusive evidence that Lucie's 
deed to Utah Savings was a mortgage. Mutual intention 
must be shown. Lucie's intention is a complete blank 
upon this record. :Mutual intention at the date of the 
deed governs. Her action afterward proves nothing, is 
only self -serving and not evidence against N orthcrest. 
Ruthrauff vs. Silve-r King Weste-rn Min. & Mill. Co., 
supra. 
2. Respondents admit the rule: A grantor may not 
make disparaging declarations after parting with title. 
The private memo on Utah Savings' loan cards was not a 
declaration. It was merely a silent and private entry 
not communicated or made known to anyone. The dec-
laration was attempted at the trial by McGee, Utah 
Savings' officer. It was incompetent. Utah Savings had 
already conveyed to N orthcrest three years before. 
3. The notary's testimony repudiating the certifi-
cate of acknowledgment was incompetent. But, if not, 
it was insufficient by law to overcome the certificate 
itself. The law of evidence treats the certificate as 
equaling (if not outweighing) the notary's testimony 
against it. Hugh's attempted corroboration was incom-
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petent because (1) it violated his warranty in his deed 
to Northcrest, and, (2) it was derogatory of his title 
after he had conveyed. The evidence then was only 
equipoised and respondents failed in their burden of 
proof. 
4. Respondents proved no forgery of Lucie's deed 
to Hugh. It was only shown (and admitted) to have not 
been signed by her hand. There was no evidence that 
the signature was not authorized and the notary's certi-
ficate, if it stands, establishes Lucie's adoption of the 
signature. 
5. The recording of Lucie's deed to Hempstead 
established a presumptive delivery. Respondents offered 
no evidence to refute that prima facie fact. The delivery 
thus stands. 
6. Whatever tax title, if any, Lucie got from Spen-
cer Clawson inured to Hempstead under Lucie's prior 
deed to him. The statute says so. §78-1-9. The 1907 tax 
was already delinquent when she warranted to Hemp-
stead in 1908. And, she warranted against that tax. She 
and respondents (her successors) are thus estopped to 
assert it against Hempstead or his successor, Northcrest. 
7. Respondents proved no valid tax title in Claw-
son. They had the burden to do so step by step. They 
introduced only the abstract. The certificate of sale and 
tax deed are not set out therein; only a brief memo 
thereof. Therefore, the certificate cannot be tested for 
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its required statutory form nor the deed for "the facts 
recited therein". Not being before us, they provide no 
prima facie evidence of the sale or facts recited therein. 
It is only as if it were stipulated these documents had 
been issued without stating their contents. Anson vs. 
Ell£son, supra .. 
8. X orthcrest was not estopped to acquire the Utah 
Savings and Hempstead titles. Hugh is the one estopped. 
Not N orthcrest. He warranted to it. Respondents are 
confused. The situations they cite are not like this. 
Those were executory situations where a vendee still 
owing the unpaid purchase price acquired and asserted 
an adverse title against his unpaid vendor. That is not 
allowed. The vendee's obligation cannot be wiped out 
in that fashion. 
9. Respondents failed to establish adverse title in 
Lucie. The finding must be set aside. There was no evi-
dence at all about possession; none whatever. It was 
stipulated Lucie paid taxes. But the record is silent on 
possession. Hempstead's deed and Utah Savings' deed 
were both outstanding throughout all the years in ques-
tion. They "established a legal title" in them (one or 
the other on the West 40 and Utah Savings on the East 
40 acre tract). They, therefore, one or the other, were 
deemed to be in possession and it was up to respondents 
to prove otherwise. They did not even try. It was not 
shown that Lucie even occupied the lands, much less 
that she used them in the exclusive adverse manner re-
<Iuired by the statute. 
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10. \V e stand corrected on the yellow lots, provided 
Lucie's deed to Hugh is sustained. For, in that case, 
since that deed specifically included those lots and Hugh 
also afterward conveyed them to N orthcrest, they passed 
in full, not just 1j3, to Northcrest. But, if the deed from 
Lucie to Hugh is not sustained, then, of course, the lots 
remained with Lucie and only passed 1/3 to Hugh by 
her devise upon her death and his after-acquired title 
to the 1/3 inured to N orthcrest by his prior deed. 
11. The court properly adjudged to N orthcrest the 
stipulated 33 "white lots" in the 20 x 30 rod strip (Capi-
tol Heights Second Filing). It also adjudged to North-
crest only 1/3 of the 32 "yellow lots" and of the rest 
of the property, too. But, if Lucie's deed to Hugh (Ex-
hibit B) was good, the judgment must be reversed out-
right and judgment entered to the whole for N orthcrest; 
otherwise, (under the Hempstead and Utah Savings 
titles) reversed and judgment entered for N orthcrest 
for the whole of the property except the yellow lots and 
for 1/3 in them. 
12. We assert the judgment of only 1/3 to North-
crest is wrong and must be reversed, with judgment for 
N orthcrest to the whole of the property. 
January 1952 
THOMAS & ARMSTRONG 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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